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This paper is a contribution to the areas of technology adoption and investment under un-
certainty. The aim is to determine the eﬀects of technological progress on current investment
decisions.
Concerning the area of technology adoption, the ﬁrst paper that is important for our work
is the seminal contribution by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They study a scenario of a
duopoly with identical ﬁrms that both have the option to upgrade their technology. To
do so they have to pay a sunk cost, while it holds that this sunk cost decreases over time.
Thus the later a ﬁrm acquires this technology the less it costs. It follows that the optimal
investment decision faces a trade oﬀ in the sense that investing soon implies that the ﬁrm
can produce more eﬃciently from an early point in time onwards, but on the other hand
large sunk costs have to be paid. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) consider endogenous ﬁrm
roles, so that it is not determined beforehand which ﬁrm will be the ﬁrst investor. They
show that the outcome is either a preemption equilibrium with dispersed investment timings
and rent equalization, or a joint adoption equilibrium.
Recent extensions of the Fudenberg-Tirole framework include Stenbacka and Tombak
(1994) (see also G¨ otz (2000)), in which an uncertain time period is introduced, that ranges
from the acquisition time to the time that the technology is successfully implemented. An-
other recent extension can be found in Hoppe (2000), where uncertainty concerning the
performance of the new technology is introduced. Once the technology is acquired, the true
value of the technology is revealed, which is observed by the rival ﬁrm. In this way, the ﬁrm
that invests second free-rides on the risk the ﬁrst ﬁrm has taken by investing in a technology
2of unknown value, which may lead to second mover advantages.
In Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Subsection 9.3) the Fudenberg-Tirole framework is com-
bined with the theory of investment under uncertainty (real options), by imposing that the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow is no longer deterministic, but satisﬁes a Brownian motion process instead.
Nielsen (1999) shows that in this model competition on the output market decreases the
option value of waiting and therefore duopolistic ﬁrms will invest earlier than monopolis-
tic ﬁrms. Unlike Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), both Nielsen (1999) and Dixit and Pindyck
(1996, Subsection 9.3) consider a new market model, which means that the ﬁrm starts being
active after adopting the technology. In a new market model only the preemption equi-
librium holds, meaning that the joint adoption equilibrium no longer applies. In Huisman
and Kort (1999a) this new market model is extended by imposing that ﬁrms are already
active on the market before the technology is upgraded. Consequently, the joint adoption
equilibrium is restored. In Huisman and Kort (1999a) scenarios are identiﬁed in which either
the preemption equilibrium or the joint adoption equilibrium prevails.
The research presented in this paper is motivated by the fact that present investment
decisions are inﬂuenced by technological progress. A ﬁrm that invests today faces the risk
that a much better technology becomes available tomorrow. The fact that this can happen
provides an incentive to delay the investment. To include this kind of mechanism, the paper
extends the model of Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Subsection 9.3) by incorporating an additional
technology that becomes available at an unknown point of time in the future. This means
that our model contains two diﬀerent technologies that can be adopted, i.e. the technology
that is currently available, and the most eﬃcient technology that becomes available at a
future point of time. At the moment the ﬁrm invests, it enters the market, so, like Dixit and
3Pindyck (1996, Subsection 9.3) we are considering a new market model. In this framework
the possible invention of a more eﬃcient technology raises the option value of waiting to
invest in the current technology, but on the other hand the presence of a competitor may
induce the ﬁrm to invest quickly, and thus forget about future technological progress.
Our results show that taking into account that a superior technology will be invented in the
future can have substantial implications for the ﬁrm’s investment decision. Compared to the
case where technological progress is not included (Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Subsection 9.3)),
taking into account the possible occurrence of a new technology could turn a preemption
game into a war of attrition, which is a game where the second mover gets the highest payoﬀ.
This could happen when the ﬁrst mover invests in the current technology, while the second
mover waits for the new technology to arrive and invests then in it, and can be explained
as follows. Compared to the strategy of its competitor, the beneﬁts of the ﬁrst investor are
the monopoly proﬁts gained during the period that starts at the moment of investment by
the ﬁrst investor and lasts until the moment that the second mover invests. However, these
monopoly proﬁts can be more than oﬀset by the eﬃciency gain the second investor enjoys
due to producing with a more eﬃcient technology, which takes place after both ﬁrms have
invested.
From the theory of real options it is known that the option value of waiting with investment
increases with revenue uncertainty. For our model this implies that increased uncertainty
delays adoption of the current technology, so that the probability that the new technology
is invented before the investment in the current technology has taken place increases. This
leads to the conclusion that increased revenue uncertainty induces a higher probability that
the new technology will be adopted instead of the current technology. Hence, uncertainty
4raises the technological level within ﬁrms! Another result that is worth mentioning here is,
that in a faster growing market a ﬁrm is more inclined to wait for a more eﬃcient technology
to arrive.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. After
some preliminary analysis in Section 3, the outcome of the game for diﬀerent probabilities
concerning the future appearance of the new technology is presented in Section 4. Section 5
collects the economic implications.
2M o d e l
We consider two identical, risk neutral and value maximizing ﬁrms that can make an
investment expenditure I (> 0) to become active on a market. We denote the ﬁrms by i and j,
with i,j ∈{ 1,2} and i  = j. The ﬁrms discount future proﬁts at rate r (> 0). At the beginning
of the game, entering the market means producing with the existing technology 1. However,
the decision to invest in technology 1 will be inﬂuenced by technological progress. Adopting
technology 1 would have been a bad decision if a little later a much better technology becomes
available. In our model technological progress is included as follows. At the stochastic time
T (> 0) a new and better technology 2 becomes available for the ﬁrms. Time T is distributed
according to an exponential distribution with mean
1
λ (> 0), so that the arrival of technology
2 follows a Poisson process with parameter λ.
Alternatively, in the one decision maker model in Grenadier and Weiss (1997), technolog-
ical progress was modelled by assuming that it follows a Brownian motion process. At the
moment that this process reaches a prespeciﬁed level, a new technology becomes available
for adoption. By observing the diﬀerence between the current level of the Brownian motion
5process and this prespeciﬁed level, the ﬁrm has an idea about how long it still will last
until the new technology arrives. In our model the arrival of a new technology follows a
Poisson process so that at every point in time the probability that a new technology arrives
is the same. Hence, our approach implicitly assumes that the ﬁrms have no information
about the progress made within the research and development process of the technology. A
disadvantage of the Grenadier and Weiss approach is that a Brownian motion process can
be decreasing over time which leads to the strange observation that technological progress
decreases as time passes.
We assume that ﬁrms can invest only once and that the investment costs of both tech-
nologies are equal. Concerning the proﬁt ﬂow it is assumed that it is stochastically evolving
over time according to a Brownian motion process. We apply a speciﬁcation frequently used
in Dixit and Pindyck (1996). The proﬁt ﬂow of ﬁrm i at time t(≥ 0) equals
πi (t)=Y (t)DNiNj, (1)
where Nk denotes the technology that ﬁrm k (∈{ i,j}) is using. Hence, Nk ∈{ 0,1,2},w h e r e
0 means that the ﬁrm is not active. Y (t) follows a geometric Brownian motion process
dY (t)=µY (t)dt + σY (t)dω(t), (2)
Y (0)=y, (3)
where µ(∈ (0,r)) is the drift parameter, σ (> 0) is the volatility parameter, y(> 0) is the
starting value, and dω(t) is an increment of a Wiener process. Thus dω(t) is distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt. In the remainder of the
paper we omit the time dependence of Y (t) whenever there is no confusion possible.
We make the following assumptions on the D’s. First, a ﬁrm makes the highest amount of
proﬁts with a given technology if the other ﬁrm is not active (monopoly). It also holds that,
6given its own technology, proﬁts are lowest when the other ﬁrm is a strong competitor, thus
producing with the eﬃcient technology 2. Second, given the technology of the competitor,
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are higher when it produces with the modern technology 2. In this way
the following inequalities are obtained:
D20 >D 21 >D 22
∨∨∨
D10 >D 11 >D 12
(4)
Finally, since it is a new market model, ﬁrms do not earn anything as long as they have not
adopted a technology. This implies that, for Nk ∈{ 0,1,2} :
D0Nk =0 . (5)
3 Preliminary Analysis
Our aim is to establish the analysis for purely identical ﬁrms. This means that it is not
decided beforehand which ﬁrm will be leader or follower, i.e. which ﬁrm will be the ﬁrst to
invest. The following section presents equilibria for this scenario. However, before being able
to do so, we ﬁrst have to determine the payoﬀs in case the ﬁrm roles are ﬁxed beforehand,
which is done in this section. Here one ﬁrm gets the leader role and invests ﬁrst. The other
ﬁrm is the follower, which has the choice to invest at the same time as the leader or later.
In Subsection 3.1 we consider the case where both technologies are already available, thus
where t ≥ T. In Subsection 3.2 technology 2 has not been invented yet.
3.1 Analysis for t ≥ T
Three cases are possible when the second technology is already available. First, we consider
the case where no ﬁrm has invested before time T, followed by the case where only the leader
7has invested before T. Finally, we give the payoﬀ for the case that both ﬁrms have already
invested before T.
3.1.1 No Investment before Time T
Since t ≥ T, technology 2 is already available for adoption. This technology is more
eﬃcient than technology 1, and therefore the ﬁrms will never invest in technology 1. Hence,
a game arises in which both ﬁrms consider entering a market by investing in one available
technology, where the proﬁt ﬂow evolves stochastically over time. In fact, such a game is
considered in Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9) (see also Huisman and Kort (1999a)).
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3.1.2 One Investment before Time T
Here the leader has already invested in technology 1. Now the problem of the follower is
in fact equal to that of a monopolist that considers entering a market where the proﬁt ﬂow
equals YD 21. From the analysis of this standard investment problem (see, e.g., Dixit and
8Pindyck (1996)) it is obtained that the value of the follower equals
Φ12 (Y )=

   
   
A12Y β1 if Y< Y F
12,
YD 21

























The value of the leader follows automatically:
Λ12 (Y )=

   
   
YD 10
r−µ + B12Y β1 if Y< Y F
12,
YD 12
r−µ if Y ≥ Y F
12.
(13)
When Y< Y F
12 the proﬁt ﬂow is too low for the follower to invest. Therefore the leader enjoys
monopoly proﬁts. If the leader receives these forever, the leader’s total proﬁts would equal
YD 10
r−µ . But it has to be taken into account that in the future Y could reach Y F
12 at a certain
point of time. Then the follower will enter the market so that the leader’s monopoly proﬁts
will be reduced. The term B12Y β1 is the correction factor that incorporates this reduction
into the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ for Y< Y F
12. Therefore, the constant B12 is negative and, due to the
fact that the leader’s value function is continuous at Y F






 1−β1 D12 − D10
r − µ
. (14)
3.1.3 Two Investments before Time T
The implication is that both ﬁrms have already invested in technology 1. Therefore, the




93.2 Analysis for t<T
First, the follower’s problem is analyzed, followed by the problem of the leader. Then we
consider the joint mover payoﬀ, and ﬁnally we determine the expected payoﬀ in case both
ﬁrms wait for technology 2.
3.2.1 Follower
First, we determine the follower’s value if the follower waits for technology 2, while the
leader has already invested in technology 1. Then we consider the case where the follower can
also invest in technology 1, and determine the scenario under which investing in technology
1 can be optimal for the follower.
Follower Waiting for Technology 2
The value of the follower is denoted by F12 (Y ), and must satisfy the following Bellman
equation




E [dF12 (Y )]. (16)
Itˆ o’s lemma tells us that (for the deﬁnition of Φ12 (Y ) see (10)):













+λdt(Φ12 (Y ) − F12 (Y )) + o(dt). (17)










2 − (r + λ)F12 (Y )+λΦ12 (Y )=0 . (18)
10Using the two possible expressions for Φ12 (Y ) (see (10)), the solution of (18) equals
F12 (Y )=

   
   
γ1Y β∗




















∗ − 1) + µβ
∗ − (r + λ)=0 . (20)
Expressions for γ1 and γ2 are found by solving the continuity and the diﬀerentiability
conditions for F12 at Y = Y F
12. This is done in AppendixA.1. It turns out that γ1 < 0
and γ2 > 0. In equation (19) we see that for Y< Y F
12 the expected value of the follower
consists of two parts. The second part equals the value of the option to adopt technology
2 (cf. equation (10)). The ﬁrst part is a (negative) correction term, due to the fact that
technology 2 is not available yet. Whenever Y is above the threshold Y F
12 the follower is
going to adopt technology 2 at the moment that it becomes available. This last observation
explains the last two terms of equation (19). The second term equals the expected present


































11The third term is the expected present value of the investment cost that ﬁrm has to pay at










Please note the diﬀerence between equations (21) and (22), i.e. the factors λ
r+λ−µ and λ
r+λ.
In equation (21) the µ is subtracted from the denominator, in order to take into account the
expected increase of Y .
If currently it holds that Y (t) ≥ Y F
12, it can still be the case that Y lies below the threshold
Y F
12 at the time that the second technology arrives. Therefore, the correction term γ2Y β∗
2,
is added to the follower’s value. This correction term is positive, since it reﬂects the fact
that the ﬁrm is not committed to make an investment. Undertaking the investment would
be suboptimal when Y is below Y F
12 at the moment the new technology is invented. Thus
γ2Y β∗
2 values ﬂexibility. Notice that this correction factor vanishes when Y goes to inﬁnity.
This for the reason that the probability that Y (T)i sb e l o wY F
12 goes to zero when Y goes
to inﬁnity.
Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
When Y increases, the opportunity costs of waiting rise. This could imply that, given
that the probability that a more eﬃcient technology is invented soon is suﬃciently low, the
follower is going to adopt technology 1 for large values of Y . Therefore, intuition suggests
that, in case of λ suﬃciently low, there exists a threshold Y F
11 such that the follower will wait
12with investing if Y< Y F
11 and for Y ≥ Y F
11 the follower will adopt technology 1. Then the
value of the follower is denoted by F11 (Y ) and equal to
F11 (Y )=

        
        
δ1Y β∗



























Equation (23) is derived by solving the follower’s optimal stopping problem (see Appendix
A.1). Solving the continuity and diﬀerentiability conditions for F11 at Y = Y F
12 and the
value matching and smooth pasting condition for F11 at Y = Y F
11 gives expressions for the
constants δ1,δ 2 and δ3 (which can be found in AppendixA.1).
The term δ1Y β∗
1 consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part, (δ1 − δ2)Y β∗
1, is a correction term
in the same fashion as γ1Y β∗
1 and the second part, δ2Y β∗
1, is the value of the option to adopt
technology 1. It turns out that the correction factor always dominates the option value and
therefore δ1 < 0. The interpretation of A12Y β1 is equal to the interpretation of the same
factor in equation (19). The term δ2Y β∗
1 equals the option value of adopting technology
1, which implies that δ2 > 0. The correction factor δ3Y β∗
2 is exactly equal to γ2Y β∗
2, thus
δ3 > 0. Lemma 2 in AppendixB states the signs of the constants.
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The threshold Y F
11 has the following properties:
(i) Y F










11 approaches the follower’s threshold for adopting technology 1 in a model without












11 approaches inﬁnity if λ approaches λ
∗
1.
A proof of Proposition 1 can be found in AppendixB. It is intuitively clear that the
threshold Y F
11 is rising with λ, but due to the complexity of expression (24) it was impossible
to ﬁnd an analytical proof for this statement. A larger λ implies that technology 2 is expected
to arrive sooner and therefore it is in the follower’s interest to postpone the adoption of
technology 1. Hence, the threshold for adopting technology 1 will be set higher.
The follower postpones the adoption of technology 1 forever when Y F
11 approaches inﬁnity.
It is easy to verify that lim
Y F
11→∞
δ1 = γ1, lim
Y F
11→∞
δ2 =0a n dδ3 = γ2. This implies that equation
(23) turns into equation (19) when Y F
11 goes to inﬁnity.
3.2.2 Leader
Here we consider the case where the leader invests in technology 1 (for the case where the
leader invests in technology 2, see Subsection 3.1). Two scenarios are analyzed. In the ﬁrst
scenario the follower only considers investing in technology 2, while in the second scenario
investing in technology 1 is an alternative for the follower.
Follower Waiting for Technology 2






Y (t)D10 exp(−rt)dt +e xp( −rT)Λ 12 (Y (T))





Y (0) = Y

. (27)
14This leads to the following expression for the leader curve (see (13), (14), and Appendix A.2)
L12 (Y )=

   
   
ε1Y β∗
1 + B12Y β1 + YD 10
r−µ − I if Y< Y F
12,
ε2Y β∗




r−µ − I if Y ≥ Y F
12.
(28)
Expressions for ε1 and ε2 are derived by solving the continuity and diﬀerentiability conditions
for L12 at Y = Y F
12, which is done in AppendixA.2. Lemma 4 in AppendixB states that ε1
and ε2 are both positive. The terms ε1Y β∗
1 and ε2Y β∗
2 correct for the fact that technology 2
has to arrive before the follower can adopt that technology and the leader’s value becomes
Λ12. The longer it takes before technology 2 arrives, the longer the leader makes monopoly
proﬁts, i.e. the better for the leader. As in (13), B12Y β1 stands for the option that Y exceeds
Y F
12, so that the follower will adopt technology 2, which ends the leader’s monopoly proﬁts.
Consequently, as can be seen in (14), B12 is negative. The value ε2Y β∗
2 equals the option
that Y falls below Y F
12. This is good for the leader because if Y< Y F
12 the follower will not
invest so that the leader keeps on having monopoly proﬁts. This explains why ε2 is positive.
Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
In this case the value of the leader is given by
L11 (Y )=

        
        
φ1Y β∗
1 + B12Y β1 + YD 10





























The derivation of equation (29) and expressions for φ1,φ 2 and φ3 can be found in Appendix
A.2. The signs of φ1 and φ3 are equal to the signs of ε1 and ε2 in (28), respectively (see
Lemma 5 in AppendixB).
The constant φ2 values the possibility that Y rises above Y F
11 before technology 2 arrives.
On the one hand that event is good for the leader, since the follower adopts technology 1
15and not technology 2. On the other hand it is bad for the leader, because it no longer has a
monopoly position. The following proposition states under which conditions φ2 is negative
or positive, i.e. which argument dominates the other. The proof is given in appendixB.
Proposition 2







If equation (30) does not hold, the sign of φ2 can go both ways.
Equation (30) states that the relative proﬁt gain the follower can make by adopting tech-
nology 2 is larger than the relative proﬁt loss that the leader faces when the follower adopts
technology 2. Inequality (30) is most likely to hold when the leader is almost indiﬀerent con-
cerning the technology the follower switches to. In that case it is not good for the leader if
the follower switches to 1 immediately rather than waiting for 2. Consequently φ2 is negative
which is conﬁrmed by Proposition 2.
3.2.3 Joint Investment






The waiting curve (see also Huisman and Kort (1999b)) gives the expected value if both
ﬁrms wait with investing until technology 2 arrives. The waiting curve equals
W (Y )=E [exp( −rT)Φ 22 (Y (T))|Y (0) = Y ]
=

   
   
η1Y β∗
1 + A22Y β1 if Y< Y F
22,
η2Y β∗
2 + λY D22
(r+λ−µ)(r−µ) − λI
r+λ if Y ≥ Y F
22.
(32)
For a derivation we refer to AppendixA.3. There we also present ex pressions for η1 and η2.
The constant η1 is negative and the constant η2 is positive. These constants have the same
economic interpretations as γ1 and γ2, respectively.
Proposition 3
It always holds that F12 (Y ) >W(Y ).
This proposition is proved in AppendixB and is a direct result of the new market assump-
tion. The follower starts making proﬁts after its investment and from the follower’s point of
view it is best that the leader adopts technology 1.
4 Equilibria
In this section ﬁrm roles are endogenous which means that it is not determined beforehand
which ﬁrm will be the ﬁrst investor. We describe the possible equilibria of the technology
adoption game before the arrival of technology 2. It turns out that the type of the equilibria
is completely determined by λ. In the following theorem we describe this relationship.
Theorem 1
There are three regions for λ.
17(i) If λ ∈ [0,λ
∗
2) the equilibrium is of the preemption type.




3) the equilibrium is of the attrition type.
(iii) If λ ∈ [λ
∗
3,∞) both ﬁrms wait with investing until technology 2 arrives.













The ﬁrst λ region is split up into two λ regions: [0,λ
∗






1 is given by




2. In case equation (30) does not hold,
the second region for λ does not exist. In each of the following four subsections one of the
regions for λ is analyzed and the equilibria are characterized. In the remainder of this section
Theorem 1 is implicitly proved. The propositions in this section are proved in AppendixB.
4.1 Case 1
I nt h eﬁ r s tc a s ew eh a v eλ ∈ [0,λ
∗
1). From the analysis of the previous section we know that
in this region the follower is going to adopt technology 1 for Y large enough. This implies
that in the equilibrium analysis the leader curve is given by equation (29), the follower curve
by (23), the joint investment curve by (31), and the waiting curve by (32). The following
proposition states that there exists a preemption threshold in this region.
Proposition 4
Let λ ∈ [0,λ
∗





















11 and T F
11 as follows: T P
11 =i n f
 




11 =i n f
 




Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the leader curve exceeds the waiting curve for some Y .F r o m
Huisman and Kort (1999b) it follows that the equilibria of this game with waiting curve are
equal to equilibria of the game without waiting curve. This means that in analyzing the
game the future arrival of technology 2 can be ignored for the moment (of course, if, despite
the low probability, technology 2 arrives before one of the ﬁrms has invested in technology 1,
the outcome must be reconsidered). Hence, a game must be considered where two ﬁrms have
to determine their optimal timing concerning the investment in a given technology. This is
in fact the game described in Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9), see Huisman and Kort
(1999a). Here we repeat the most important aspects.
Theorem 2
Consider the game with y ≤ Y P
11. It holds that in equilibrium the leader adopts technology
1a tt i m eT P
11 and the follower adopts technology 1 at time T F
11.
Of course, Theorem 2 is conditional on the fact that technology 2 does not arrive before
time T F
11. Further we should remark that if Y P
11 <y<YF
11 there exists a positive probability
that the ﬁrms invest simultaneously at time 0 (cf. Huisman and Kort (1999a)). In equilib-
rium the expected value of each ﬁrm equals the follower value. Figure 1 graphically shows
the curves in this case.
The investment opportunity is worthless for Y equal to zero. Therefore, at Y =0t h e
leader (L)a n dj o i n ti n v e s t m e n t( M) value equal minus the investment cost and the follower
(F) value equals zero. The further shape of the curves L, F, M and W can be derived from




































Figure 1. Case 1: λ ∈ [0,λ ∗
1).
With Figure 1 the preemption mechanism can be clearly explained. Consider the game
with Y (0) ≤ Y P
11. Assume that both ﬁrms pass Y P
11 without investing and the current value
of Y ,s a yY (t), exceeds Y P
11. Then for one of the ﬁrms it is optimal to invest at time t,
since the L-curve lies above the F-curve, implying that investing ﬁrst gives a higher payoﬀ
than investing second. The other ﬁrm knows this and will try to preempt its competitor by
investing at time t− , since it knows that the other ﬁrm would like to be the ﬁrst to invest
at time t. But then the other ﬁrm will try to preempt at time t − 2 . It is clear that this
process of preemption stops at Y P
11,s i n c ef o rY< Y P
11 it holds that F(Y ) >L (Y )s ot h a t
there are no incentives to invest ﬁrst.
The following proposition gives an expression for the probability that technology 2 arrives
after a certain threshold is hit. The proof of the proposition is given in AppendixB.
Proposition 5
Let TS =i n f ( t|Y (t) ≥ S). At time t =0the probability that the geometric Brownian




   




   β1 if y<S ,
1 if y ≥ S,
(36)
where














From Proposition 5 we derive that the probability that technology 1 is adopted by the
leader (follower) decreases with λ. An increase of λ leads to both a higher threshold and a
higher   β1.
4.2 Case 2




2). Here the probability that technology 2 arrives
soon is that high that the follower is going to wait for technology 2. As in the previous case
there exists a preemption threshold.
Proposition 6




2). Then there exists a unique Y P














We deﬁne T P
12 in the same fashion as T P
11: T P
12 =i n f
 
t|Y (t) ≥ Y P
12
 
. Furthermore we deﬁne
T F
12 =i n f
 





In equilibrium the leader adopts technology 1 at time T P
12 and the follower adopts technology
2a tt i m eT F
12.
21As above the leader’s adoption of technology 1 is conditional on technology 2 not arriving
before time T P
12. If initially Y is above Y P
12 then with positive probability both ﬁrms adopt
technology 1 at time 0. The expected value of each ﬁrm equals the follower value. The curves



































Figure 2. Case 2: λ ∈ [λ∗
1,λ ∗
2).
From the fact that Y P
12 is rising in λ and Proposition 5 it can be concluded that the
probability that the leader adopts technology 1 decreases with λ.
4.3 Case 3




3). Here the probability that
technology 2 arrives is even higher than in Case 2, where it was already high enough for the
follower to wait for technology 2. This implies that also in this case the follower is going to
wait for technology 2. In this region there does not exist a preemption threshold, i.e. the
follower curve is situated above the leader curve for each Y . This implies that the game
22without waiting curve is an attrition game.
Proposition 7




3). Then there exists a unique Y L














The following theorem describes the equilibrium conditional on technology 2 not arriving
before time T L
12 =i n f
 





In equilibrium the leader adopts technology 1 at time T L
12 and the follower adopts technology
2a tt i m eT F
12.
The curves for the diﬀerent payoﬀs in this game are depicted in Figure 3. The leader
curve shows the expected payoﬀ as function of Y for a ﬁrm that invests in technology 1
immediately. This ﬁrm knows that its competitor will invest in technology 2 as soon as it
becomes available and Y> Y F
12. The leader has the advantage of monopoly proﬁts until
the time that the follower invests in technology 2, but the disadvantage of producing with
a less eﬃcient technology after this date. On the other hand the waiting curve shows the
expected payoﬀ if both ﬁrms wait for technology 2 to arrive. As long as the waiting curve
lies above the leader curve, investing now in technology 1 is not a sensible option. Therefore,
the attrition game starts at time T L
12.
In the attrition game the follower curve is situated above the leader curve and the leader
curve above the joint investment curve for all positive Y. This implies that there does not



































Figure 3. Case 3: λ ∈ [λ∗
2,λ ∗
3).
are two asymmetric equilibria, which are summarized in Theorem 4 (each ﬁrm can either
be leader or follower). For simplicity reasons we assume that each equilibrium occurs with
probability one half.
Proposition 5 together with the fact that Y L
12 is increasing with λ imply that the probability
that the leader adopts technology 1 is decreasing with λ.
4.4 Case 4
In the fourth case (λ ∈ [λ
∗
3,∞) ) the probability that technology 2 will be invented soon
is that high that both ﬁrms wait with investing until technology 2 arrives. This is reﬂected
by the fact that the waiting curve exceeds the leader curve for all Y in this region. Figure 4
shows the curves in this case.
At the moment that technology 2 arrives, a game starts where both ﬁrms consider entering
am a r k e tb yi n v e s t i n gi none available technology (the presence of technology 1 can be ignored


































Figure 4. Case 4: λ ∈ [λ∗
3,∞).
Hence, like in Case 1, the framework of Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9) again applies.
The diﬀerence is that in Case 1 the Dixit and Pindyck game has to deal with investment in
technology 1, while here the investment in technology 2 must be considered.
5 Economic Analysis
The Poisson parameter λ is the key parameter for the results. Waiting for the new tech-
nology is better when the probability that this new technology becomes available soon, is
high enough. If this probability is low enough both ﬁrms only consider when to invest in
the current technology, while ignoring the new one. In this case the usual preemption game
arises (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9) for its
stochastic counterpart).
If the probability that technology 2 becomes available soon is not too small, i.e. the
Poisson parameter exceeds λ
∗
1 (cf. (25)), then the game is still a preemption game, so that
each ﬁrm tries to be the ﬁrst investor. However, the ﬁrm that will invest second is better oﬀ
25by waiting for the new technology rather than investing in the current one.
If λ is again a bit larger such that it exceeds λ
∗
2 (see (33)), the preemption game turns
into an attrition game. Like in the previous case, the ﬁrst investor chooses the current
technology and the second investor will wait for the new technology, but the diﬀerence is
that the payoﬀ of the second investor is higher here. Hence, neither ﬁrm would like to be the
ﬁrst investor, but if they both keep on waiting, their payoﬀ will be even less than the payoﬀ
of the one that decides immediately to invest ﬁrst. According to Hendricks et al. (1988) a
unique asymmetric equilibrium exists where the adoption timings are dispersed.
If λ exceeds λ
∗
3, given by (34), then the probability that technology 2 arrives soon is that
large that both ﬁrms will wait for this new technology. The possibility to invest in the
current technology will be ignored.
It is clear that for λ = 0 the model exactly equals the one treated in Dixit and Pindyck
(1996, Chapter 9). Here there is no technological progress in the sense that the probability
that a new technology will be invented is zero. Hence both ﬁrms only need to consider
investing in the current technology, so that the problem boils down to the determination
of the optimal point in time that a ﬁrm must enter a market with stochastic proﬁt ﬂow,
while taking into account the behavior of an identical competitor. The resulting game is a
preemption game, like the one where λ is positive but below λ
∗
1. It holds that Y P
11 increases
with λ so that the possible occurrence of a new technology will delay investment in the
current technology, which is intuitively plausible.




3)s h o w st h a t
taking into account the possible occurrence of a new technology could turn a preemption
game into an attrition game.
26To learn more about the eﬀects of the future availability of a more eﬃcient technology on
the optimal timing of investment, we also carry out comparative statics analysis on the other
parameter values. Let us ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of revenue volatility which is measured by
σ. The general prediction of the real options literature is that a higher level of uncertainty
increases the threshold level and therefore will have a negative eﬀect on investment. In
our model an increased threshold level implies that the investment in technology 1 will
be delayed. Therefore, the probability that technology 2 arrives before the investment is
undertaken, increases. Hence, the conclusion is that increased revenue uncertainty induces a
higher probability that the new technology will be adopted instead of the current technology.
Next, consider the expected growth of the market reﬂected by the parameter µ.A n
increase of µ reduces the values of λ
∗
i, with i ∈{ 1,2,3}. In general this means that the
probability increases that the ﬁrm will delay or totally refrain from investing in the current
technology. The reason is that in case of a fast growing market the ﬁrm will exploit this
growth as much as possible by using the more eﬃcient new technology. The ﬁrm is more
willing to wait for this technology to be invented.
The eﬀect of the discount rate is completely opposite to the eﬀect of the expected market
growth rate. A higher discount rate implies that immediate proﬁts are more important to
the ﬁrm. Therefore the ﬁrm prefers investing in the current technology rather than waiting
for the new one.
Finally, consider the eﬀects of the several proﬁt ﬂows. First, notice that λ
∗
1 increases with
D11 and decreases with D21. This can be explained by the fact that the second investor is
more willing to produce with the ﬁrst technology if D11 is large, while it likes to wait for the
new technology to arrive if D21 is large.
27Second, λ
∗
2 increases with D10 and D12, while it decreases with D21.T h i si m p l i e st h a tλ
∗
2
is larger if the payoﬀ of the strategy ”adopt technology 1 immediately” is higher relative to
the payoﬀ of the strategy ”wait for technology 2 to arrive and adopt it then”. Note that if








3 increases with D10 and D12, while it decreases with D22. Hence, if a high proﬁt is
reached when both ﬁrms produce with the new technology, compared to the strategy ”invest
in technology 1 immediately and have some monopoly proﬁts before technology 2 arrives”,




A Derivation of Value Functions
A.1 Follower
A.1.1 Follower Waiting for Technology 2







1 I (r(r − µ)β
∗
2 +( r − µβ1)λβ
∗
2 − (r − µ)(r + λ)β1)











2 I (r(r − µ)β
∗
1 +( r − µβ1)λβ
∗
1 − (r − µ)(r + λ)β1)






A direct result of Lemma 1 (see AppendixB) is that γ1 < 0a n dγ2 > 0.
28A.1.2 Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
The follower solves the optimal stopping problem, in which stopping means adopting






In the continuation region waiting is the optimal strategy and the following Bellman
equation must be satisﬁed




E [dF11 (Y )]. (43)










2 − (r + λ)F11 (Y )+λΦ12 (Y )=0 . (44)
Using (10) and the boundary condition F11 (0) = 0 gives
F11 (Y )=

   
   
δ1Y β∗
1 + A12Y β1 if Y< Y F
12,
δ2Y β∗
1 + δ3Y β∗
2 + λY D21
(r+λ−µ)(r−µ) − λI
r+λ if Y ≥ Y F
12.
(45)
Combining (42) and (43) gives equation (23).
Expressions for δ1,δ 2, δ3 and Y F
11 are found by simultaneously solving the continuity
and diﬀerentiability conditions for F11 at Y F
12 and the value matching and smooth pasting
conditions for F11 at Y F
11. It turns out that it is not possible to get a closed form solution for
Y F
11. The threshold Y F
















































1 − 1)(r + λ)
, (47)
δ3 =γ2. (48)
Lemma 2 in AppendixB states that δ1 < 0,δ 2 > 0, and δ3 > 0.
29A.2 Leader
A.2.1 Follower Waiting for Technology 2











   
Y (0) = Y

. (49)
Then h(Y ) must satisfy the following Bellman equation




E [dh(Y )]. (50)
Applying Itˆ o’s lemma gives













+λdt(Λ12 (Y ) − h(Y )) + o(dt). (51)










2 − (r + λ)h(Y )+λΛ12 (Y )+YD 10 =0 . (52)
Substitution of (13) in (52) and solving that diﬀerential equation gives
h(Y )=

   
   
ε1Y β∗
1 + τ1Y β∗
2 + B12Y β1 + YD 10
r−µ if Y< Y F
12,
τ2Y β∗
1 + ε2Y β∗




r−µ if Y ≥ Y F
12.
(53)
The boundary condition at Y = 0 and the condition that rules out speculative bubbles (see








r + λ − µ
+
λ




imply that τ1 =0a n dτ2 =0 .







1 ((r − µ)(β1 − β
∗
2)+λ(β1 − 1))(D10 − D12)











2 ((r − µ)(β1 − β
∗
1)+λ(β1 − 1))(D10 − D12)






A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a4ε1 and ε2 are both positive (see AppendixB).
A.2.2 Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
If Y ≥ Y F





Next we derive the value function of the leader for Y< Y F









Y (t)D10 exp(−rt)dt +1 {T≤TF










   
 



























The function f must satisfy the following Bellman equation for Y< Y F
11 :




E [df (Y )]. (61)
Itˆ o’s lemma gives
























∂Y 2 − (r + λ)f (Y )+YD 10 =0 . (63)







r + λ − µ
. (64)
































 Y (0) = Y
 
. (67)
The function g must satisfy the following Bellman equation































∂Y 2 − (r + λ)g (Y )+λΛ12 (Y )=0 . (69)
The solution of (69) is given by
g (Y )=

   
   
κ1Y β∗
1 + κ2Y β∗
2 + B12Y β1 + λ
r+λ−µ
YD 10
r−µ if Y< Y F
12,
κ3Y β∗




r−µ if Y ≥ Y F
12.
(70)
Due to the boundary condition g (0) = 0 we know that κ2 =0 . The constants κ1,κ 3 and κ4
are found by simultaneously solving the continuity and diﬀerentiability condition at Y = Y F
12



































32Combining equations (58), (59), (64), and (70 ) gives equation (29), in which
φ1 =υ1 + κ3 + ε1, (74)
φ2 =υ1 + κ3, (75)
φ3 =κ4 = ε2. (76)
Lemma 5 in AppendixB states that φ1 > 0a n dφ3 > 0.
A.3 Waiting Curve
The following Bellman equation must hold for the waiting curve




E [dW (Y )]. (77)
Itˆ o’s lemma gives













+λdt(Φ22 (Y ) − W (Y )) + o(dt). (78)


















∂Y 2 + µY
∂W (Y )
∂Y
− (r + λ)W (Y )+λΦ22 (Y )=0 . (80)













   
   
η1Y β∗
1 + A22Y β1 if Y< Y F
22,
η2Y β∗
2 + λY D22
(r+λ−µ)(r−µ) − λI
r+λ if Y ≥ Y F
22.
(83)
33The constants η1 and η2 are found by solving the continuity and diﬀerentiability conditions







1 I (r(r − µ)β
∗
2 +( r − µβ1)λβ
∗
2 − (r − µ)(r + λ)β1)











2 I (r(r − µ)β
∗
1 +( r − µβ1)λβ
∗
1 − (r − µ)(r + λ)β1)






A direct result of Lemma 1 is that η1 < 0a n dη2 > 0.
B Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 1
The following two inequalities hold:
r(r − µ)β
∗
2 +( r − µβ1)λβ
∗
2 − (r − µ)(r + λ)β1 <0, (86)
r(r − µ)β
∗
1 +( r − µβ1)λβ
∗
1 − (r − µ)(r + λ)β1 >0. (87)
Proof of Lemma 1
The assumption µ ∈ (0,r) implies that




Equation (86) holds due to equation (88) and the fact that β
∗
2 < 0.
We know that β
∗
1 ≥ β1, where the equality sign only holds for σ →∞for which we have
β
∗
1 = β1 =1 . Write β
∗
1 = ξβ1 and substitute in (87):
r(r − µ)ξβ1 +( r − µβ1)λξβ1 − (r + λ)(r − µ)β1
=r(r + λ − µ)β1 (ξ − 1) − µλβ1 (ξβ1 − 1)
=Ξ(ξ). (89)
Then Ξ(1)=0(ξ =1implies that β1 = β
∗
1 and therefore β1 =1 )a n d
dΞ(ξ)
dξ
= β1 (r(r + λ) − µ(r + λβ1)) > 0, (90)
34if and only if
r(r + λ) − µ(r + λβ1) > 0. (91)





r (r − µ)
µλ
. (92)
Therefore equation (87) holds. 
Lemma 2
The constants δ1,δ 2, and δ3 have the following signs: δ1 < 0,δ 2 > 0, and δ3 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
















1 − 1)(r + λ)
, (93)






















1 (r + λ − µ)
. (94)


































Proof of Lemma 3



















35Rewriting of (96) yields
2(r − µ)σ
2 ≥ 0. (97)
Therefore the lemma holds since we assumed that r>µ . 
Lemma 4
The constants ε1 and ε2 are both positive.
Proof of Lemma 4
From equation (56) it directly follows that ε1 > 0. The lemma holds whenever the following
statement is true:
(r − µ)(β1 − β
∗
1)+λ(β1 − 1) > 0. (98)
In order to prove that equation (98) holds, deﬁne the following function
Ω(λ)=( r − µ)(β1 − β
∗
1 (λ)) + λ(β1 − 1). (99)
For λ =0we have that β1 = β
∗




















   
λ=0
≥ 0. (101)































































 2 ≥ 0. (104)
36This implies that for r ≥ µ equation (101) holds and thereby the lemma is proved. 
Lemma 5
The constants φ1 and φ3 have the following signs: φ1 > 0 and φ3 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5




1 ((r − µ)(β1 − β
∗
2)+λ(β1 − 1))(D10 − D12)








2 ((r − µ)(β1 − β
∗
1)+λ(β1 − 1))(D10 − D12)





























































1 E2 (Y ), (107)
then it follows after some tedious calculations that






























1 (D11 − D12)
(r + λ − µ)(r − µ)
> 0. (108)
Thus φ1 is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 1
It is easy to verify that equation (24) does not have a root if λ ≥ λ
∗
1. A s s e r t i o n2c a nb e
concluded by taking a closer look at equations (24), (20), (47), and (41). The closer λ comes
to λ
∗
1 the smaller the negative term in (24) becomes in absolute terms. This implies that Y F
11
becomes larger. 
37Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1 we know that Y F
11 does not exists for λ ≥ λ
∗
1 and therefore φ2 does not
make sense for λ ≥ λ
∗
1. First we prove that φ2 ≤ 0 if equation (30) holds and λ<λ
∗
1.





(r + λ − µ)(r − µ)
−
D10
r + λ − µ
≤ 0. (109)
Equation (109) holds if
λ ≤
(r − µ)(D10 − D11)
D11 − D12
. (110)
Using equation (30) it is not hard to show that





Therefore equation (109) holds and φ2 is non-positive.









 1−β1 D11 − D10
r − µ
< 0. (112)




1(r − µ)(D11 − D10) − λ(D12 − D11)










= φ2. When equation ( 30) does not hold, the ﬁrst term in equation (113) is
positive. When λ approaches λ
∗
1 we know from Proposition 1 that Y F
11 approaches inﬁnity.
Taking a closer look at equation (113) we see that the second term goes faster to zero than
the ﬁrst term. Thus for λ close enough to λ
∗
1 we have that φ2 is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 3
This proposition is easily veriﬁed by taking a closer look at equations ( 23), (32), (40), (41),
(84), and ( 85). 
38Proof of Proposition 4
Deﬁne the function L as follows
L(Y )=L11 (Y ) − F11 (Y ). (114)
























L(Y )=(φ2 − δ2)Y
β∗




(r − µ)D10 − λ(D21 − D12)


















(r − µ)D10 − λ(D21 − D12)















































(r − µ)D10 − λ(D21 − D12)











































λ(D12 − D11) − (r − µ)(D11 − D10)




From the proof of Proposition 2 we know that
λ ≤
(r − µ)(D10 − D11)
D11 − D12
. (120)
Equations (119) and (120) together with φ3 > 0 imply equation (115). 
39Proof of Proposition 5













Since P (0) = 0 and P (S)=1the solution of (121) equals (36). 
Proof of Proposition 6
Taking a closer look at equations (19) and (28) (for Y large) we see that there does exist a
crossing point of L12 and F12 if
YD 10
r + λ − µ
+
λ









Rewriting (122) gives (33). 
Proof of Proposition 7
This proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 6, but then with equations (28)
and (32). 
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